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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENE G. SPENDLOVE, by J·OHN 
A. SPENDLO\TE, his Guardian ad 
litem, 
Plairntiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
DR. S. W. GEORGES, 
Defendarnt arnd Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8217 
(All italics, unles·s otherwise noted, have been added 
by Appellant.) 
The Clerk of the District Court in numbering the 
record on appeal has placed the transcript of proceedings 
under one number, 67. References to the record, there-
fore, will be designated by the letter "R" as to the num-
bers placed on the pages by the Clerk, and by the letter 
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'~T'' as to the various pages of the transcript. Also, by 
virtue of the fact that the Statement of Points includes, 
among others, failure of the Court to grant appellant's 
motions for dismissal and directed verdict made at the 
conclusion of the respondent's evidence, as well as failure 
to grant 1notion for directed verdict made at the conclu-
sion of all of the evidence, the statement of facts will be 
divided into two portions for the convenience of the 
Court, one summarizing evidence· to the conclusion of re-
spondent's case, the other to the conclusion of all of the 
evidence. 
PLEADINGS AND ·JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 
This action was initially commenced by complaint 
(R. 4) filed by respondent on Octoher 23, 1953, in the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and for 
Utah 'County, State: ofUtah, which /contained three causes 
of action. 'The first cause of action alleged that the ap-
pellant negligently operated on the respondent on April 
25, 1952 ; the second cause of action alleged that between 
April 25, 1952 .and September 30, 195~, the app·ellant 
negligently rendered improper post-operative care to the 
tesp:ondent; the third cause of action alleged that between 
April 25, 1952 and N ovemher 15, 1952, while respondent 
was a patient, appellant improperly abandoned and failed 
to give proper medical attention to the respondent. The 
action was prosecuted by John A._ Spendlove, father of 
the resp:ondent, as guardian ad litem, the appointment 
being bas·ed upon the fact tha:t the respondent is mentally 
incomp~etent and a ward of the American Fork Training 
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~chool (It. 7). r_}~he answer of appellant (R. 9') denied 
the allegations of negligence and resulting injury and 
darnage as to each cause of action, and affirmatively 
pleaded contributory negligence and sole negligence of 
respondent, and also sole negligence of third party or 
third parties. Pre-trial conference was held on F·ebruary 
2G, 1954 before the District Judge ( T·. 1), during the 
course of which the respondent wholly abandoned and 
dismissed the first two causes of action ( T. 1, 2), with the 
result that the case was thereafter tried as to the third 
cause of action of the con1plaint only, which alleged in 
substance abandonn1ent of the patient by the appellant, 
Dr. S. W. Georges, between dates of April 25 and Sep--
telnber 30, 1952. During the course of the pretrial con-
ference, respondent's counsel revised the dates between 
\V hich abandon1nen t vvas alleged to have occurred to be-
t\veen approxiinately Septen1her 20, 1952 and N oven1ber 
15, 1952 ( T. 3). The first date vvas further defined as 
the date of a conversation, which will be hereinafter 
detailed, 'vherein Mrs. Spendlove, the mother of the 
respondent, was notified by appeHant that he was ill (T. 
4). The terinination date of said alleged period was 
identified as the date on which a release was secured by 
the parents of respondent for purpose of placing him in 
the out-patient clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt Lake 
City, Utah (T. 4). Respondent's counsel likewise during 
course of pretrial stated the specific claims which related 
to the act of abandonment ('T. 21). ~rhese are reflected 
in the pretrial order (R. 23) reciting the claim of re-
spondent as: (1) 'l~hat the appellant failed to treat the 
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responde·nt's wound properly or at all. (2) That appel-
lant failed to advise with the respondent as to the re-
spondent's condition, and (3) Tha.t the appellant failed 
to advise the res-pondent as to the necessity of a future 
operation. 
The pretrial change as to the period within which 
the abandonment was claimed to have occurred was not 
reflected in the pretrial order, but this order was revised 
by oral amendment at the opening of the case to reflect 
the date change as set forth above (T. 30, 31). The pre-
trial order a;lso states the affirmative defense of appel-
lant, which is in addition to general denial of negligence, 
that the negligence of third parties. intervened and solely 
caused any damage or injury to respondent, as follows: 
That the father and mother of the respondent failed to 
secure medical assistance from Dr. Clair Judd, who had 
been associated with the case, and which was known to 
them; that they failed to secure such services after they 
knew that the appellant was confined to bed with illness; 
that they failed to secure medical assistance fro1n any 
physician practicing in the Provo area if the same was 
needed; that they failed to follow appellant's instruc-
tions with reference to replacing wound dressings. 
At the conclusion of resp·ondent's evidence (T. 121) 
appellant moved for a dismissal of the action and a di-
rected verdict upon the grounds detailed in the trans-
cript, including failure of evidence to establish the sole 
claim of negligence which was abandonment, and failure 
of evidence to show any causal relation between any dam-
age and injury and abandonment. In connection with the 
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clain1 of the respondent as to da.1nages, it had been as· 
serted during pretrial that there was, among other things, 
pain and suffering in a normal mental sense, and also 
that as a result of such pain and suffering the respondent 
had suffered a mental up-set requiring a change in his 
custody frorn the American Fork Training School to the 
Utah State ~rental Hospital. The Court ruled at the 
conclusion of respondent's evidence (T. 121), that the 
rnotions were taken under advisement but that there was 
no evidence of any causal connection between the mental 
up-set and any claimed act of negligence on the part of 
appellant, and that this issue of damage would be elimi-
nated from the case. The minute entry of the Clerk (R. 
59) 'vould seem to indicate that the court had dismissed 
the entire third cause of action, the only ground upon 
which the trial was based, which is inaccurate for the 
reasons indicated. At the conclusion of a:ll the evidence 
respondent moved for a directed verdict which was like-
'vise taken under advisement and the case submitted to 
the deliberation of the jury, who returned a verdict in 
favor of the respondent and against app·ellant, assessing 
da1nages in the sum of $5,000.00 ( R. 55). 
Thereafter, respondent rnoved for a new trial, (R. 
61) and at the same time n1oved to have the verdict and 
judgment set aside and judgment entered in accordance 
with the motions for directed verdict which had previ-
ously been made (R-. 63), as well as to tax costs (R. 64). 
After argument on April 2, 1954 (R .. 65), the Court on 
~fay 5, 1954 (R. 6G) denied all of the appellant's motions. 
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FACTS .&T THE CONCLUSION OF 
RESPONDEN'T'S CASE 
Plaintiff herein, Gene G. Spendlove is age 36. He 
had been a ward of the American F'ork Training School 
since 1931 (R. 49). He had at periodic intervals during 
these years been transferred for confinement to the Utah 
State Mental Hospital, although no confinement in such 
State Mental Hospital had occurred within app·rorimately 
six years prior to 1952. Mark K. Allen, psychologist, 
testified that the respondent had an intelligence quota 
of 76. and a mental age of 11 years based on tests the last 
of which had occurred in 1951 (T. 119). For two weeks 
prior to April 25, 1952, plaintiff had been with his par-
ents at their home in Provo on an Easter vacation, and 
was during this time (T. 49) under their care and cus-
tody. On this date in the late afternoon the patient was 
seized with a terrible pain in his abdomen (T. 50), and 
Mrs. Spendlove contacted American Fork Training 
School, wheTe she was advised to call their family physi-
cian (T. 50). She then called Dr. S. W. Georges, appe~­
-~ant, who came to the home and immediately referred re-
spondent to the Utah Valley Hospital at Provo (T. 51), 
operating upon him that night. The operation was prO-
tracted, and immediately fol'lowing it the doctor advised 
Mrs. Spendlove that tlie respondent had a perforated 
ulcer, that peritonitis had set in, and that respondent was 
very critically ill (T. 52), a very serious condition ex-
isted, which the parents understood (T. 69). The re-
spondent remain·ed in the Utah Valley Hosp·ital between 
April 25 and May 4, 1952 (T. 51) when he was released 
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and returned to his home. He remained at hon1e that day, 
and the following evening the incision broke open and 
respondent was immediately returned to the hospital for 
a corrective and second operation which was performed 
by appellant the evening of May 5, 1952. (T. 54, 55). Re-
spondent, following this second operation, then remained 
in the hospital for about five weeks, being discharged 
approximately June 10, 1952, when he was returned to 
his home. While the respondent was in the hospital fol-
lowing this second operation, appellant's father died in 
California and appellant immediately left for that State 
on or about May 11 or 12th (T. 70). During appeilant's 
absence Dr. Clair Judd of Springville, Utah, cared for the 
patient until Dr. Georges returned about a week or ten 
days later (T. 71). During this period of Dr. J1Uidd's care 
Mrs. Spendlove discussed the case with him, apparently 
by ca:lling at Dr. J udd's- office ( T. 71). 
The father of the patient also knew that Dr. Judd 
\Vas attending this patient during appellant's absence 
(T. 93), and there was no objection on the part of the 
parents to this arrangement (T. 72). 
Following the patient's discharge from the hospital 
about June 10, 1952, the parents of respondent, and par-
ticularly ~irs. Spendlove, took the respondent to Dr. 
Georges' office ap~pro:rimately once a we·ek until sometime 
in July or August when an abscess near the incision was 
lanced, and thereafter they took the patient to the office 
about twice a week (T. 72). No record was kept by the 
parents as to the dates of visits to the doctor's office 
(T. 72). About two weeks after the discharge from the 
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hospital following the second operation, a cloth belt was 
prepare·d for the patient by Mrs. Spendlove. During this 
period ('T. 57), which presumably means July and Aug-
ust, the incision area. was running and had some red 
bean-like projections, which appeared in two different 
places (T. 73). Mrs. Spendlove testified that in late July 
or sometime in August she had a conversation with ap-
pellant at his offices with reference to the costs of the 
treatment and operations (T. 57), and at that time the 
doctor instructed her to change the dressing on the in-
cision every day and to bring the patient to him about 
once a week (T. 57), which she did. About September 13, 
1952, Mrs. Sp·endlove was again in Dr. Georges' office 
with the respondent when he advised her that the incision 
would require another operation and the expenses were 
again discussed and Mrs. Spendlove stated, "I guess I 
will have to .appeal to my Church" (T. 58). Apparently 
on this date appellant gave her a prescription to he 
sprinkled on the incision prior to bandage replacen1ent 
(T. 76). Mrs. Spendlove, during a~ll of September and in 
fact until the respondent was ultimately taken to the out-
patient clinic of the L. D. S. Hospital on November 7, 
19·5·2 ('T. 77), used this prescription daily, and likewise 
changed the bandages each day. This daily treatment 
with prescription and bandage dressing continued during 
all of the period in which it is claimed the respondent 
did not receive medical attention from appellant. 
About s·eptember 27, 1952, Mrs. S·pendlove took re-
spondent to ap,p·ellant's office and was told by Nurse Jean 
Rowan that the· appellant was not avai~lable. Mrs. Spend-
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love stated to the nurse that she was going to talk about 
the scheduling of a further operation with appellant, 
and was then advised that there was no operation sched-
uled ( T. 60). Mrs. Spendlove testified that she was not 
sure as to the exact date ( T. 79) of this -conversation, 
though she thought it was the latter part of September. 
It should be noted that respondent makes no claim 
of improper operation or medical treatment of any kind 
as to the foregoing doctor-patient relationship, and con~ 
cedes that the doctor in every respect fully performed 
any a.nd all treatm.ent and obligation whi1ch he had toward 
the patient. The claimed date of the period in which 
abandonment is asserted to have occurred commenced 
as of the date of a conversation with respondent which 
took place three days later after the last conversation to-
\vard the end of Septe1nber, when Mrs. Spendlove called 
appellant at his home (T. 61, 80). The telephone was 
ans\vered by ~Irs. Georges, who advised Mrs. Spendlove 
that the doctor was iH, to which Mrs. Spendlove replied 
HWell, then, let's not bother hi1n if he is ill, Mrs. Georges, 
let's just \Vait until he gets better" (T. 61). Mrs. Georges 
then referred ~Irs. Spendlove to the nurse, and ~Irs. 
Spendlove again said "J!ean, let's wait until the doctor 
gets a little better", to which the nurse, Jean Rowan, 
replied "No, he can't see you, but he will talk to you" (T. 
61). Thereupon 11rs. Spendlove talked to appeHant. ~irs. 
Spendlove stated that she \vas sorry to hear appellant 
\Vas so ill, and he advised her that in fact he was very 
sick and had pneun1onia (T. 61, 80). Mrs. Spendlove 
further describes the conversation, (T. 62): 
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"Then I told hiln I said the area around it 
' was getting more infected and I said, 'After the 
other terrib1e experience 've had had,' I said, 'You 
can't blame me for being 'vorried' arnd he said, 'Do 
you w~ant another doctor f' And I didn't kno\v 
what to say. And I said 'No, Dr. Georges, I don't.' 
Then he repeated, 'Well, I a1n not getting out of 
this bed for the President of the United States.' 
And I said, 'Well if I could just he assured he 
would be all right until you get a little better.' 
'Well,' he said, 'it has gone on th1Js long rurn.ning 
that way, it w~on't hurt it to go a little longer.' And 
I said., 'Well, all right,' and hung up and that wa.s 
the end of the conversation." (T. 62) 
From this time forward no call was ever made by 
the Spendloves to appeHant, to his office or to Dr. Clair 
Judd, who had treated the patient with full knowledge 
of the respondent's family during the period in May, 
19·52 when Dr. Georges' father's death require1d his ab-
sence from Utah (T. 81). Yet his family knew how to get 
in touch with Dr. Judd (T. 81). About six weeks later, 
according to Mrs. Sp~endlove's estimate, the family of 
respondent discussed with Gerald D. Stone, Bishop of 
_the L.D.S. Church, the possibility of referring respondent 
to the Out-Patient Clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt 
Lake City, under the C·hurch Welfare Program. Accord-
ing to Bishop Stone, acting in behalf of respondent, he 
called appellant's office about November 6 or 7th (T. 
114) for the purpose of getting a release. He was re-
ferred by the nurse to Dr. Judd at Sp·ringville, who ex-
ecuted such release, which was then sent with this p·a.tient 
to the L.D.S. Hospital (T. 115, 116). Mrs. Spendlove 
10 
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knew that the release had been secured and its purpose 
(T. 82). 
Dr. George Miller, who was on the staff of the L.D.S. 
Hospital, first saw the respondent in the Out-Patient 
Olinic on November 7, 1952, and on his initial examination 
found patient to be in quite good general physical condi-
tion (T. 34), except as to the operative area where he 
found a seven inch scar on the upper abdomen, and about 
one inch to the right of the scar two small drainage areas 
about 1 cc. in diameter, and a hernia with a stomach dis-
tention (T. 34). Dr. Miller probed the areas and removed 
a small piece of cotton suture from the upper area, 
cauterized both areas with silver nitrate, put on a dry 
dressing and instructed the patient to return in two weeks 
and Mrs. Spendlove to change dressings (T. 35). On 
November 15, 195·2 respondent returned to the G'linic, 
cotton suture was removed from each area and dressing 
changed (T'. 35). On November 29, 1952, no sutures were 
found by probing, wounds were cauterized and dressing 
changed ( T. 35). 'On December 27, another suture was 
removed from the upper area and an intestinal x-ray 
taken to determine the state of the ulcer (T. 35). By De-
cember 13, the two areas were smaller. Dr. Miller de-
scribed the infected sores as a sinus about one-half inch 
deep, i.e., a surface opening which did not extend into 
the abdomen (T. 38). He stated that it was not unusual 
for pieces of suture to work to the surface at the areas of 
incision ( T. 39). The doctor went on to point out that it 
is necessary to cure the infection near the op!erative site 
because of the danger of its spreading if surgery is at-
11 
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tempted (T. 37), and that there was nothing urgent about 
this third operation u,ntil such time as this ilnfection was 
completely cleared up (T. 42). He also pointed out that 
it is desirable to let operative areas rest for sometime 
before repairing an incision hernia to let the Inuscular 
tone redevelop and the tissues return to normal to pre-
vent difficulties in the operative p·rocedures (T. 43), and 
that frequently a lapse of SL"'{ months to a year is per-
mitted to let the tissues restore to proper form before 
op·erating on this. type of hernia case (T. 43), although 
that in his own practice he "\vould wait about six months 
('T. 44). The doctor empha:Sized that the respondent had 
a disruption of his wound to which such wait applied, and 
that in fact the third operation later performed was ap-
proximately six months after the herniation had de-
veloped (T·. 44). 
During the entire time of app-ellant's illness and 
to the date on which Dr. Clair Judd executed a rele-ase 
of the patient on or about November 7,1952, Mrs. Spend-
love had daily changed dressings on the incision area 
an1d sprinkled the prescription given her by appellant 
on such area. Dr. Miller testified, after his attention had 
been directed to the fact that the last suture removed 
from the wound by probing had been removed on Decem-
ber 27, 1952, that it wa.s entirely possible that the third 
operation would have been performed about the same 
time that it actually was performed, whether respondent 
saw a doctor or not, and "It is questionable whether he 
would have found all the sutures sooner than we did" 
(T. 45). This question was then asked: "Q. In other 
12 
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\vords you are dealing with pure speculation~" To which 
Dr. Miller answered, "That's right, mother nature." (T. 
45 ). 
Dr. MiHer was removed fro1n the surgical service 
at the L.D.S. Hospital the end of December, 1952, but 
did see the respondent again on January 17, 1953, when 
there still was infection at the site of the incision (T. 36), 
and he described the purpose of the L.D.S. treatments 
as simp~ly to heal the two small areas as it was impossible 
to do any further surgery until they were in proper surgi-
cal condition (T. 36). The third operation on respondent 
\Vas performed at the L.D.S. Hospital on February 28, 
1953 ('T. 64), and he remained at the hospital for ten days 
thereafter (T. 65). About the time that respondent was 
taken from the Hospital he grew 1nore nervous and it was 
difficult to keep him in bed (T. 66). He was then taken 
to the psychiatric ward of the County Hospital of Salt 
Lake County for one day, and thereafter to the State 
l\[ental Hospital at Provo, where he remained six months 
and \Vas ultimately returned to the American Fork Train-
ing School (T. 67). 
The sister of respondent, l\!Iarjorie Breinholt testi-
fied that during the four to six weeks prior to the time 
respondent started treatment at the Out-Patient Clinic 
at the L.D.S. llospital, he got thinner, had pains, \Vas 
pale, inactive and tired ( r_r. 107). On cross-examination, 
however, she adrni tted that he had been getting thinner 
frorn the tin1e of the first operation in April, 1952, that 
he \Vas critically ill in the hospital following the first two 
operations, that he was pale during the period of his en-
13 
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tire illness and that he had had stomach pains (T. 109). 
In other words, she admitted that these symptoms. de-
scribed had been present long prior to the time of aplJel-
lant' s i!llness. The testimony o.f Mrs. ·Sp·endlove wa.s 
essentially similar (T. 67, 82, 83, 84). No medical ex-
p·erts., other than Dr. Miller, were called by respondent. 
F AC'TS. A·T ·CONCLUSION OF! ALL EVIDENCE 
There is limited evrdentiary confiict on matters of 
importance. The testimony of the witnesses, including 
medical experts, called by appellant, provided amplifi-
cation of much of the testimony and periods involved, 
and also estabiished with greater accuracy various dates 
of consideration since the witnesses for respondent main-
tained no records anid understandably were uncertain in 
many instances as to precise dates. 
Dr. S. W. Georges, app·eilant, described his extensive 
medical education, the fact that he had practiced medicine 
and surgery in Utah since 1931, was in 195·2 ·Chief of the 
Surgical Department of the Utah Valley Hospital, and 
in 1953 and 19·54 President of the Staff of such hospital 
(T. 12'4). He had been the Sp·endiove's family physician 
since 1945 hut had never seen the respondent and in fact 
did not know that he existed (T. 124). He describe:d his 
visit to the Spendlove home the night of the first opera-
tion on Ap~ril 25, 1952, and the difficult and serious na-
ture of the op·eration, since the stomach contents had 
extruded from an ulcer in the stomach into the abdominal 
cavity in great quantity, causing a very severe peritonitis 
and adhesion of the bowels throughout the abdominal 
cavity ('T. 127). He described in detail the operation 
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\vhich lasted approxi1nately two and one-half hour~ (T. 
129), and his discussion with the SpendloiVe famHy in 
the presence of Dr. Clair Judd 'vho assisted in the oper-
ation following the same. (The Spendloves admit the 
conversation with appellant, but deny that they re-
1nen1bered Dr. Judd as present.) In this conversation 
he advised of the very serious condition of patient, but 
that ~'so long as there is life, there is hope." ('T. 130). 
lie visited the respondent t\vo or three times a day dur-
ing the week foHo\ving the operation and while he was in 
the Utah Valley I-Iospital ( T. 131), and also detailed a 
stormy and difficult post-operative confinement for the 
first week (T. 131). The doctor described the condition 
of respondent at the thne he was re-admit~d to the 
hospital_on ~lay 5, 1952, for the second operation, and 
the fact tha.t the lower incision had opened with a serous 
fluid draining. This second, operation was again extreme-
ly difficult, particularly since the patient had eaten 
vast quantities of food preventing initial general anes-
thesia and requiring spinal (T. 133). He again operated 
and sutured the incision, part of which sutures were of 
cotton ('1,. 134). Dr. ·Clair Judd again assisted with this 
operation and follo,ving the same, together with appel-
lant, talked \vith the Spendlove family in the patient's 
room following the operation (T.135). Appellant advised 
the Spendloves that peritonitis had again set in, tha.t in 
view of this fact and the previous serious illness, re-
spondent was in a "very serious" condition (T·. 135 ). The 
second hospita1ization continued from May 5 until June 
10 (T. 136) and again appellant visited respondent either 
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two or three tiines a day, except for the period between 
May 11 and 22nd when he had to leave unexpectedly 
and immediately for California as the result of the death 
of his father (T. 136). He describes the fact that the 
physical condition of the patient fO'llowing the op-eration 
was critical and serious, although he was improved at 
the time appellant left for California fT. 137). Between 
May 22 and June 10, 1952, when respondent was dis-
charged from the hospital, he improved, and at the fatter 
date his condition was good, recouperation had started, 
incision was healing and he was up and around from May 
20th to discharge (T. 138). Both Mr. and Mrs. Spendlove 
know of the fact that Dr. Clair Judd was attending the 
patient while appellant was in California (T. 138), and in 
fact Dr. Jud4 talked to Mrs. Spendlove daily about the 
condition of the responiden t ('T. 193) . 
On June 17th respondent was brought to appel-
lant's office by :h{rs. 'Spendlove and was feeling well. 
At this point the incision was healing, th·ere was no drain-
age, and the dressing was changed (T. 140). Nurse Jean 
Rowan assisted Dr. Georges in changing the dressings 
during ali of the visits whic:Q_later occurred, except for 
a brief period when she was on vacation in July. On 
June 21, 1952, ap-pellant again changed the dressing in 
his office and a small spot on the incision, the size of a 
pea, had develope·d which was starting to drain (T. 142). 
Ap·pellant changed the dressing, cleaned it up, redressed 
it and replaced the scultetus, which is a spe-cie of cloth 
abdominal binder or corset designed to confine the ab-
domen. Appellant saw respondent at his offices again 
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on June 24, and in July on the follo\ving dates: 1, 3, 8, 
14, 18, 21 and 28 (T. 143). During July respondent was 
eating well and feeling good except for the drainage at 
the incision, points about the size of a pea (T. 144). 
rrhe doctor dressed the wound and replaced the bandage, 
sprinkling either a little sulfa po~vder or aureomycin 
on the incision and replacing the scul tetus ( T. 144). In 
August he sa\v him on August 4, 8, 15, 19 and 26, again 
redressing the incision area, and on one occasion removed 
a piece of cotton suture which had been used to sew up 
one of the ston1ach layers on the second operation, an 
occurrence which is not unusual (T. 145). The drainage 
spot at the incision during August was doing well, but 
still draining though getting less ( T. 145). Also during 
the first part of August evidence of herniation of the in-
cision began to appear ( T. 146), which the doctor de-
scribed as a separation of the inner layers of the ab-
dominal wall ( T. 146) . 
The latter part of August, or early September, ap-
pellant had a conversation with Mrs. Spendlove at which 
nurse, Jean Rowan, was present, wherein he advised her 
that a hernia had developed and would ultimately require 
another operation (T. 146), but that before, that could be 
done the sore had to heal, that "it isn't urgent but this 
has got to heal first" ( T. 14 7). Mrs. Spendlove com-
plained about the cost, and was advised by appellant that 
she had better consult the Bishop and see if they could 
get help fro1n the Church since the expenses would be 
paid by the Church, including hospitalization, etc. l\1rs. 
Spendlove agreed that she would see the Bishop of the 
Church and let appellant kno\v (T. 148). 
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In September appellant saw respondent on the 2, 9, 
16, 23 and 30th, and during this period he was progress-
ing well and doing fine, although there was a small drain-
age still present at the incision ( T. 149, 150). In the early 
part of September the doctor instructed Mrs. Spendlove 
as to making a new body binder as the oJd one was cutting 
the respondent, and the method of ehanging the dressing 
and placement of a prescription powder on the wound 
(T. 150). 
The appellant described the necessity of a third op-
eration, the fact that it is very dangerous to perform 
such an operation when there is infection at the incision 
site, and that it is customary to wait at least six months 
to a year to permit the tissues to strengthen before again 
incising (T. 151). The appellant advised Mrs. Spendlove 
of the necessity of the third operation, but stated that at 
no time did he tell her it was to be p·erformed within any 
specific period of time ( T. 151). Sp·ecifically as to the 
time of performance of the third operation he stated (T. 
151): 
"Q. Doctor, how often do you nonnally perform 
that typ·e of operation after a hernia develops 
of the type involved h·ere ~ 
A. We usually wait at least six months, some-
times a year. The fact is these tissues being 
under stress and strain, they are fragile, fri-
able, they have no strength, if you repair 
them too soon they will break out again." 
Appel'lant described the effects of a hernia of the 
typ·e here involved, as relatively mild, and the fact that 
distention of respondent's somach wall was not very ex-
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tensive, but gradually getting a little larger, though held 
in check with the binder (T. 152). He also pointed out 
that where a perforated ulcer is accompanied with gen-
eralized peritonitis, the ulcer is not ren1oved but merely 
closed, and unt,il such ti1ne as the ulcer was entirely 
healed there would be pa.in present jro1n the ulcer itself 
(T. 152). 
By the first of October, 1952, the doctor had a cold 
and \Vas in bed that day, returned to the office and kept 
\Vorking until the afternoon of October 4, when he went 
to bed again \vith pain and coughing (T. 153). An opera-
tion had been previously scheduled for October 6, and the 
doctor perfor1ned the same, going home that day and 
direct'ly to bed follovving a few office appointments (T. 
153). By October 7, appellant had developed a severe 
chest pain, a temperature of 103 degrees, with a cough, 
badly inflamed and S\vollen sinuses, and difficulty in 
breathing (T.153). Dr. Clair Judd vvas ca'lled on October 
8, and he testified that appellant was severely ill with a 
high ternperature of 103¥2, chest pains, rales throughout 
his chest, lung phlegm, an infected sinus and throat, and 
virus pneumonia (T. 196). On October 10, appellant 
\Vas bedridden with virus pneumonia, high temperature 
and other sy1npton1s, when Mrs. ·Spendlove called in the 
afternoon ( T. 154). ~frs. Georges answered the phone 
and stated that the doctor \Vas ill and that she did not 
think he could talk to her (T. 154). After Mrs. Spendlove 
talked to the nurse, appellant picked up the phone by 
his bed and talked to Mrs. Spendlove ( 'r. 155). The con-
versation appears at T. 155, as follo\vs: 
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''A. I said 'Hello !Irs. Spendlove.' And she 
' ' "k'I says, 'I arn sure sorry you a.re s~c . says, 
'Mrs. Spendlove, I am very sick, in fact I a.1n 
so sick I have virus pn.eumonia.' And she said, 
'Well, I run terribly worried about Gene.' 
'Well,' I says, 'Mrs. Sp·endlove, I don't see 
any reason why you should be worried, all 
you have to do is change the dressing and 
everything will be all right for a little while.' 
I said, 'I am very ill, I just can't com.e out and 
take care of arn.yone.' I said, 'Do you want 
another doctor? I will c:all a doctor, or you call 
Dr. Judd.' She got angry with me, she said, 
'Dr. Georges!' and hung up, and I was still 
holding the receiver in my hand. My wife 
said, 'What is wrong~' I said, 'She hung up 
on me.' That was the end of it. 
Q. Was an thing said about getting out of bed for 
the President of the United States~ 
A. I forgot that. When I said I was very ill, I 
couldn't take. care of anyone, in fact I says, 
'I can't even take care of the President of 
the United States.' I did say that, I am not 
denying it." 
Mrs. Georges (T. 210) and Nurs.e J'ean Rowan were 
p·resent in the room, and heard the statements made by 
appellant to Mrs. Spendlo;ve (T. 221, 222). Both con-
firmed the statement~s of appellant in this conversation 
as testified to by him, and both testified as to the abrupt 
manner in which Mrs. Spendlove slammed down the re-
.ceiver ending this conversation. 
When asked as to the condition of respondent at his 
last office cal'l on September 30, 1954, app·ellant stated 
that it was not dangerous (T. 186). 
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From October 6 forward, appellant's illness contin-
ued and he was treated by Dr. John Rupper, Dr. Clair 
Judd and Dr. Ellis (T. 156), and was attended each day 
by nurse Jean Rowan. He was taking medicine of various 
kinds, ineluding penicillin, streptomycin, aureomycin, 
stearn inhalations and hot packs (T. 156), and the virus 
pnPun1onia accornpanied with acute sinusitis continued. 
On ·October 11, he was taken to the hospital in his bath-
robe for the purpose of taking x-rays but was otherwise 
in bed entirely ( T·. 157). He was not hospitalized as no 
roorn "\Vas available at the Utah Valley Hospital. By 
October 23rd the chest involvernent was improved, but 
there was continuing difficulty with the sinuses, and 
pursuant to the recornmenda tions of the attending doc-
tors, who prescribed a warrner cli1nate, appellant went to 
Phoenix on October 23, 1952, 'vhere he stayed until No-
venlber G, thereafter returning to Utah ('T. 158). While 
in Arizona, appellant continued under medical care. 
During this en tire period appellant was too ill to 
engage in the practice of medicine in any way and in fact 
did not do so ( T. 159). He had, however, instructed Dr. 
Clair Judd that "\Vhenever any of rny patients or my 
nurse calls you take care of my patients." (T. 160), and 
had also named as additional alternates in the event that 
Dr. Judd "\Vas not available for his patients, Dr. Rex 
Thomas and Dr. John Bowen (T. 159). AppeBant in-
formed Dr. Judd, who, of course, had participated in both 
previous operations, as to the condition of respondent 
(T. 177). 
While appellant was in Arizona, and on either the 
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latter part of October or the first or s·econd of November, 
1952, he called from Phoenix to his office an'd was. advised 
by his nurse that a release had been executed relative to 
resp·ondent entering the L.D.S .. Hospital ('T. 162). The 
doctor stated between October 6 and his return from 
Plioenix, he w~as physically unable to treat any patient, 
had not in fact treated any p·atient or engaged in the 
practice of medicin·e (T. 159), and that the last time he 
received any call from the Spendloves was when Mrs. 
Spendlove got mad and slammed the receiver in his ear 
on October 10, 1952 ('T. 163). Appellant treated no pa-
tients between October 6 and November 11, 1952 (T. 
184). 
Appellant stated (T. 183, 184) that under the prac-
tice in Provo, a doctor cannot make a patient take another 
doctor, as that patient must be free to make a selection 
of .his own choice. 
Dr. Clair Judd was also called on behalf of appel-
lant, and likewise described the first and seconid opera-
tions and hospital convalescence progress of respondent 
( T. 195-). He described the serious illness of appellant 
in detail from its beginning in late September forward, 
and the difficulty in treatment of appellant because the 
virus infection p·resent did not respond to normal anti-
biotics ('T. 197). Dr. Judd categorically stated that ap-
pellant was not, in his. opinion, well enough to attend 
patients during any of this time (T. 197). He instructed 
ap·pellant that it was necessary to go to Phoenix or a 
warmer climate, since if he started working too soon with 
the virus infection and colds he had been having, he 
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'vould suffer a relapse. Appellant had a past history of 
virus infection difficulty in 1936, when he had been con-
fined in the L.D.S. Hospital from January to August 
(T1• 182), an element of concern during his present illness. 
Dr. Judd described the instructions given to him by 
appellant relative to respondent when it became apparent 
that appellant was seriously ill, and likewise the custom 
in Provo relative to a substitute doctor, at T. 198, 199: 
"Q. During this period did Dr. Georges give you 
any instructions with reference Gene Spend-
love~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was the first of such instructions, do 
you remember~ 
A. The first day I saw him at his home was on 
the 8th. 
Q. What was his instructions~ 
A. He told rne Gene's condition. Well, he told 
me before, all along he had talked about Gene, 
and I knew pretty well how Gene was even 
without him telling me at that time. But he 
again described how it was and asked me if I 
would take care of him if they called me. 
Q. What did you say to that~ 
A. I said I would. 
(~. Did you call the Spendloves at all1 
A. No. 
Q. Why not, Doctor~ What was the practice with 
reference to that~ 
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A. If they thought Gene ne·ede:d a doctor's care 
they wou(ld call me. It isn't good p·ractice for 
us to choose ourselves or anybody unless they 
want us to come. 
Q. Doctor, during this entire period when Dr. 
Georges wa.s ill did you maintain your offices 
in Springville, were they op·en ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you available~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you at the Utah Valley Hospital during 
that period~ 
A. Y·es. 
Q. How freqeuntly~ 
A. Eve~ry day. 
Q. Do you have nurses in your office there in 
S p·ringville ~ 
A. I ha.ve a receptionist. 
Q. She is there during the day~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You phone is listed in the phone book, is it1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Both home and office~ 
A. Yes." 
Dr. Judd, testifying with refe·rence to respondent, 
stated that it wa.s unwise to try and rep·air respondents 
hernia in the p·resence of infection, and that practice 
requires waiting for the infection to heal (T. 208). 
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Dr. John H. Rupper likewise attended appellant 
during his i~llness of ·October and e~arly November (T. 
229). He first saw appellant on October 9, 1952, at his 
home and diagnosed his condition as that of virus pneu-
monia with acute sinusitis (T. 230). On October 11 he 
SR\V appellant Hgain, who was unimproved with continu-
ing high temperature, and still bed-ridden. Since appel-
lant was not responding to treatment, Dr. Rupper se-
cured pathological studies during the week of August 
12 to 18 and by October 20 appellant vYas improved some-
what, but was still bedridden and with continuing lung 
infection and he was "physically unable to treat patients" 
(T. 233). Dr. Rupper was concerned about relapse (T. 
234), particularly with virus pneumonia, and recommend-
ed that appeHant innnediately get to a warmer climate for 
better treatment of the respiratory infection (T. 233). 
He again testified that the appellant was too ill to prac-
tice during the period in question (T. 236). 
Nurse Jean Rowan likewise testified as to the opera-
tions perfor1ned on respondent and the method of treat-
lnent during the months of J'uly, August and September 
as being that of basically of removing the bandage over 
the incision and redressing ( T. 21G). She confirmed ap-
peHant's version of the conversation "\vith Mrs. Spendlove 
about the first of September 1952, when ·expenses were 
discussed, appellant suggested they con tact the Bishop 
and get so1ne help from the Church, and Mrs. Spend-
love stated she would do so ( T. 217). She also described 
the sta.te1nent of the doctor to Mrs. Spendlove that the 
third operation c.ould not he performed until the draining 
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areas were clear (T. 218), and lik·ewise confirmed the 
statements made by appellant in the conversation with 
Mrs. Spendlove on October 10,1952 (T. 22'2). 
Bishop Stone called at the office after ap·p·ellant had 
gone to Arizona and in the latter p·art of October (T. 223) 
and wanted to know whether he could have the appellant 
sign a release. The nurse told him the doctor was ill and 
to contact Dr. Judd who could sign the release since he 
had been previously connected with the case (T. 223). 
Later the nurse advised ap·p·ellant that the release had 
been signed when the appellant called by telephone from 
Phoenix (T. 224), prior to his return to Provo and re-
sumption of p·ractice. 
STATEMENT OF' POINTS 
Appellant relies upon the foHowing points: 
Poin.t No.1 
The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion 
for.dismissal an~d directed verdict made at the conclusion 
of the respondent's. evidence (T. 121). · 
Point No.2 
The trial court erred in denying app·ellant's motion 
for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of all the· 
evidence (T. 238, 239), and in failing to give appellant's 
requested instruction No. 1, (R. 34), directing the jury 
to return a directed verdict in behalf of appellant. 
Point No.3 
The trial court erred in refusing to give app·ellant's 
request for Instruction No. 5 (R. 38) to which failure 
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appellant excepted (T. 244), and which reads as follows: 
"In determining whether or not the defendant 
properly discharged his responsibilities as a phy-
sician and surgeon in this case, you should judge 
the defendant by con1parison of his conduct with 
the standard of conduct on the part of the ordi-
narily and reasonably careful physician and sur-
geon practicing in Provo, Utah in the year 1952. 
~ehe fact that the defendant may have conducted 
hin1self in a 1nanner different fro1n the way doc-
tors ordinarily perfor1n their services in other 
comn1unities, if such be the fact, is innnaterial be-
cause the defendant \vas required only to exercise 
such reasonable care, diligence and consideration 
for his patient as was ordinarily exercised by the 
ordinarily skillful physician and surgeon practic-
ing in Provo, Utah in the year 1952. 
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in 
this case that the defendant exercised the ordinary 
and reasonable care, diligence and consider~ation 
of his patients as was exercised by the ordinarily 
skillful physician and surgeon in Provo, Utah in 
1952, you must return a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant and against the plain tiff no cause of ac-
tion." 
Point No.4 
The trial court erred in refusing to give appeHant's 
request for Instruction No. 9 (R. 42), to which failure 
appellant excepted (T. 244), and which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that the sole issue of 
negligence claimed by plain tiff in this case is 
\Vhether or not Dr. S. W. Georges abandoned 
the plaintiff in the fall of 1952, beginning on the 
date on which Mrs. Maude Spendlove, Inother of 
plaintiff, talked to Dr. S. W. Georges at his home 
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and was told the Doctor was ill and ending with 
the date on which Bishop Ston~ obtained the re-
lease from Dr. Clair Judd relative to placing 
plaintiff under care of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
"·There has been evidence introduced in this 
case re'lative to the operations performed by the 
defendant on the plaintiff on April 25, 1952 and 
May 5, 1952, and the care· rendered by him in 
conne-ction therewith. Such evidence is not to be 
considered by you as any indication that plaintiff 
cLaims damage or injury resulting from either 
of the two operations or from the treatment af-
forde·d to the pl·aintiff by defendant with respect 
to said operations. Plaintiff ·does not make such 
claim." 
Point No.5 
The trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's 
request for Instruction No. 11 (R. 44), to which failure 
a.pp~ellant excepted ('T. 244), and which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that in this case the· plain-
tiff Gene Spendlove was a .mental incompetent 
and a ward of the American Fork Training School, 
a public institution for n1entally deficient persons. 
During all times herein involved he was living 
with and under the direct sup·ervision of his par-
ents, M·aude and John Spendlove. 
"You ar~e therefore instucted that the defend-
ant, DT. S. W. Georges, had a right to assume that 
the parents of Gene S·pendlove would take such 
action with reference to employment of doctors 
·and seek prop~er medical attention for Gene Spend-
love as would be taken by any normal person in 
the exercise of reasonable care in his own behalf 
under similar circumstances." 
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PDint No.6 
The trial court err·ed in giving Instruction No.5 (R. 
49) to the giving of which appellant excepted (T. 242), 
and which re~ads as foHows: 
"In this action the defendant as an affirma-
tive defense claims that the parents of the plain-
tiff were negligent in the particulars set forth 
in Instruction No. 1. If you find that the defend-
ant was guilty of malpractice or negligence, then 
you should consider and determine whether the 
parents of the plaintiff, or eithe:r of them, were 
also guilty of negligence, and further, whether 
such negligence was an efficient intervening cause 
"vhich displaced the conduct of the defendant in 
proximately producing the plaintiff's injury and 
dam~age. However, if the negligence of the par-
ents was only a concurring cause of the plaintiff's 
injury, then you should find against the defendant 
on this defense. 
"The test by which you will determine this 
issue is as follows: If the defendant foresaw, or 
by the ·exercise of ordinary care would have fore-
seen, the probability of the conduct of the parents 
of the plaintiff, and the probability that the. de-
fend ant's conduct and that of the parents would 
result in injury to the plaintiff, then the conduct 
of both was the proximate cause of the injury. 
But, if the probable result could not have been 
foreseen and if the immedi~a.t.e cause of the injury 
was the conduct of the pa.ren ts, then your verdict 
must be in favor of the defendant, no cause of ac-
tion. The burden is on the defendant to prove by 
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Point No.7 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 7 (R. 
50) to the giving of which appellant excepted (T. 242, 
243), and which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that where a physician 
is employed to attend a patient the relationship 
of physician and patient continues until ended by 
the consent of the parties, or revoked by the dis-
missal of the physician, or until his services ·are 
no longer needed. The physician is required to 
exercise reasonable and ordinary care and skill 
in determin1ng when to discontinue his treatment, 
and where he fails to attend upon his p~atient and 
terminates his employment without notice to his 
patient and without affording the latter an op-
portunity to secure other medical attendance, he 
is liable for any damage caused thereby. 
"In this case if you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant discon-
tinued the care and treatment of the plaintiff; that 
such care and tre-atment were reasonably nec~s­
sary, and that the defendant failed to notify the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff's p·arents that he was 
discontinuing such care and treatment, or that 
he was unable to render further servie:e, then 
the defendant was guilty of malpractice in ·aban-
doning the plaintiff. And if you further find that 
the p[aintiff suffere.d injury and dam,age as a 
proximate result of such conduct on the part of 
the defendant, then your verdict must be in favor 
of the plaintiff." 
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ARGUMENT 
Point No.1 
The trial court ·erred in denying appellant's motion 
for dismissal and directed veTdict made at the conclusion 
of the respondent's evidence. (T. 121). 
P·oint No.2 
11he trial court erred in denying appeHant's motion 
for a directed verdict n1ade at the conclusion of all the 
evidence·. (T. 238, 239). 
Both of the above two points are essentially concern-
ed \Vith the fact that the evidence, whether taken as it 
stood at the conclusion of the respondent's case, or of the 
en tire case, fails to establish the abandonment of the pa-
tient by appellant, \Vhich is the ground of claimed negli-· 
gence, failed to show any causal relation between any 
such clairned abandonment and any injury or damage re-
spondent might have suffered, and that if in fact there 
\vas any pain and injury, it was caused solely by the negli-
gence of the parents of respondent, in whose custody he 
\vas at and prior to the time of alleged abandonment. 
AppeHant respectfully asserts that this proceeding 
is of the utrnost irnportance to the rnedical profession of 
Utah as a whole, because the action of the trial court 
in refusing to grant motions of dismissal and for directed 
verdict has necessarily accepted a definition of abandon-
nlent which irnposes an unreasonable and unwarranted 
burden on any doctor who is so stricken with illness that 
he is unable to attend his patient, and an illness more-
over, over \\'hich he has no control. Appellant makes such 
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assertion fully cognizant of the fact that this court must 
necessarily confine its consideration to the evidence of 
this record, and in one sense its concern to the litigants 
herein. 
Much of the testimony does not directly tie with the 
claimed act of .abandonment, afthough it does hear on 
the question of the claimed nature and extent of the ill-
ness of respon·dent in the general period of claimed aban-
donment, and the problem of causal relationship· between 
claimed negligence and any resulting injury. 
Act of Abamdonm.ent 
T·his record shows that the respondent and plaintiff 
was an adult of 36 years of age during the events of con-
cern; had been at periodical intervals confined to the 
Utah State Mental Hospital, and had otherwise for many 
years been under the care of the American Fork Train-
ing· School, and who, according to the p~sychologist called 
by respondent, had the mentality of a boy 11 years old. 
Two weeks p·rior to the time that appellant saw respond-
ent for the first time, respondent had been in the care and 
custody of his parents, the Sp·endloves, at the family 
home at Provo, Utah. He had been taken to such· home 
for Easter Vacation from the American F'ork Training 
School. 
The evidence indicates the critical} condition of re-
spondent the night of April 25, 1952, when appellant oper-
ated on him for an ulcerated stomach at the Utah \Talley 
Hospital. The operatio~ was of a serious nature as vast 
quantities of food had poured from the stomach into the 
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abdo1ninal cavity, and bo,vel adhesions had set in with 
accompanying peritonitis prior to the time of this op-
eration. As the appeHant advised the parents, the patient 
'vas critically ill that night and for several days following 
the operation. 
Respondent remained in the hospital until May 4, 
1952, having an initia!l storn1y convalescence, and on such 
date was returned to his home. The record indicates it 
was most difficult handling him at the hospital and ap-
pellant testified that ~irs. Spendlove told him on more 
than one occasion with reference to the overall iHness, 
that she 'vas "scared to death" of responaent (T. 149). 
In any event, the incision ha.d started to pull apart 
and had herniated following the first operation, with the 
result that a second and again difficult operation was 
perforined the night of May 5, 1952, with in fact many 
of the complications of the first operation. Thereafter 
respondent was discharged from the hospitrul in early 
June and for a time seemed to progress rather well. 
There was, ho,vever, a small external infection at the in-
cision site 'vith the result that the doctor 'vas seeing the 
patient periodically throughout the months of June, July, 
August and September, at which visits the dressings 
were changed at the incision site for the purpose of clear-
ing up the infection before a third operation cou~d be 
performed. 
By late Sept!ember and early October appellant was 
becoming ill, and by this ti1ne was bedridden with virus 
pneumonia, acute sinusitis, high fever and other inci-
dental and related ailments. If there is any fact clear 
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in this· record it is the il.lness of the ap·p,ellant, which con-
tinued to November 11 1952 when he again resumed 
' ' the practice of medicine. The record contains detailed 
testimony of app·ellant himself and of his attending phy-
sicians, Dr. Clair Judd and Dr. Jlohn H. Rupper that a~ 
pellant was bedridden at Provo until ap·proximately 
O·ctober 23, when he was told hy his physicians that it was 
essential for him to enter a warmer climate since the 
virus infection present had not cleared up in .a satisfac-
tory manner and this was the prescribed treatment. 
The· record is also clear, based on the undisputed testi-
mony of all of the doctors who testified in behalf of ap-
p·ellant, which is uncontradicted in any way .by the re-
spondent, as in fact it could not be, that appellant was 
plvysically unable to treat any patients or engage in the 
practice of medicine during this period and 1m fMt he did 
not .do BO. 
. · On or about October 10, 1952, a conversation occur-
red between Mrs. ·sp.endlove, in whose custody the re-
spondent then was and who had assumed responsibility 
·for securing medical care and assistance for him, and 
appellant. In this conversation an·d based solely upon the 
testimony introduced by respondent, Mrs. Spendlove was 
advised and knew that the doctor was seriously ill with 
pneumonia, that he was unable to treat patients, and was 
asked by the doctor whether or not she wanted him to se-
·cure another doctor. The conversation as related by M:m. 
Sp·endlove, Nurse Jean Rowan and app~el'lant included 
this notice given above, but went further in that the doe-
tor had in addition asked Mrs. Spendlove whether she 
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desired him to call Dr. Clair Judd. This apparently is 
the alleged act of abandonment, which is an incredible 
assertion under the circumstances a;s evidenced by the 
record. Before the return of appHllant to active practice 
on November 11, 1952, the S·pendloves themselves, 
through Bishop Gerald D. Stone, secured a release of 
respondent for the purpose of placing him in the out-
patient clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital, which release was 
executed in behalf of the appellant by Dr. Clair Judd. 
The record is likewise clear that the custodians of re-
spondent knew that by this affirmative act they were 
terminating all relations with appellant by securing this 
release. AppeHant was advised of this fact while he was 
at Pho,enix, Arizona, approxim·ately a week prior to hi's 
return to his practice. It is difficult to grasp the theory 
upon which the respondent attempts to predicate aban-
donment. It can scarcely he on the date of the conversa-
tion with the app'ellant, when the Spendloves were ·ad-
vised of an illness preventing practice by appellant and 
further notified that appellant would obtain another 
doctor for them if desired. There was obviously nothing 
more that the doctor could do on that date whether he 
desired to or not, and he certainly did all that could be 
done by way of notice and offer to secure another doctor 
that could be expected or was even possible. It may be, 
and respondent has. never defined any date of abandon-
ment either on pretrial or otherwise, that respondent 
claims this act occurred sometime subsequent to the ini-
tial conversation, yet again appellant is at a loss to un-
derstand when the act occurred because he was physi-
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cally unable to and did not treat any patients at any thne 
thereafter, to NOivember 11, 19-52, which was subsequent 
to the date a formal release was secured by the Spend-
loves from Dr. C1air Judd. He was able to go to Arizona 
on October 23 for further medical treatment and in a 
favorable climate, and yet the· ·evi<lence is uncontradicted 
he was still physically i'll and still not attending his. prac-
tice. In s·hort, the ·doctor performed every possible 
obligation toward this patient during the appellant's 
il,lness, and ther'e was obviously no abandon1nent within 
any conceivable legal definition of the same. Since these 
matters are without dispute in the record, there is no 
basis whatsoever upon which this case should have been 
submitted to the jury. 
·There are relatively few cases that appellant has 
been able to find which deal with abandonment resulting 
from the illness of th'e physician, which are factually sin1i-
lar to the instant case. ~{ost of the decisions seem to have 
been collected in an annotation "Liability of Physician 
or Surgeon Who Abandons Case" appearing at 56 A.L.R. 
819, s. 60 A.L.R. 664, and cases cited therein. There is 
one dominant factor which appears in any abandonment 
case and that is that the doctor without cause refuses or 
fails to render medicrul assistance at a tin~e when the pa-
tient is seriously and critically ill, without n.otifying the 
patient. 
The Utah case of Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P. 
(2d) 208 (1937) is factually distinct in that it does not 
involve the iflness of th·e physician, but of possible inter-
est because it is the Ut'ah case on a'bandonment. There de-
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fendant doctors had treated plaintiff for a finger infection 
arising from contact with a barbed wire. The doctors 
had operated on such finger and hospitalized plaintiff be-
tween 1farch 11 and 15th, 1935, on \vhich latter date, 
against the advice of Dr. S. 1\:f. Budge, the plaintiff left 
the hospital. He wa,s instructed by the doctor to return 
to him if the finger showed any signs of getting worse. 
It did, and, on :Niarch 17, the plaintiff went to the doctor's 
office 'vhere his finger was examined and he was immedi-
ately sent to the Budge l\fe1norial Hospital at Logan for 
treatment. Dr. S. 1\I. Budge testified that at that tim.e 
plaintiff was in a dangerous condition and needed im-
Inediate surgical and n1edical attention. Thereafter, ac-
cording to the plaintiff, vv-hen the doctor arrived at the 
hospitai he refused to proceed \vith any medical treat-
ment until certain bills had been paid. The, plaintiff there-
upon left the hospital and walked to the Cache Valley 
Hospital a few blocks away where he arrived a few min-
utes later and where an immediate operation was per-
formed by one Dr. Randall. The latter testified that when 
he sa\v the plaintiff's hand and finger, they were in seri-
ous condition and required immediate surgical attent~on. 
The majority opinion of the court held that a jury ques-
tion existed as to whether or not Dr. Budge was guilty of 
abandonment. 
The physician involved was not ill himself, which 
distinguishes the Budge case from the ins·tant case. The 
court, however, at page 211, defined abandonment in gen-
eral language: 
HvVe believe the law is well settled that a phy-
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sician or surge~n, upon tmdertakin~ an operation 
or other case 1s under the duty m the absence 
' ' . of an agreement limiting the service, of continu-
ing his attention after the first operation or first 
treatment, so 'lo~g as the case requires attention. 
The obligation can be tenninated only by the 
cessation of the necessity which gave rise to the 
relationship, or by the discharge of the physician 
·by the patient, or by the withdrawal from the case 
by the p.Juysiciati'IJ after giving the p:atient reason-
able notice so as to enable the p~atient to- secure 
other medical attention. A physician has the right 
to withdraw from a case, but if the case is such as 
to still require further medical or surgical atten-
tion, he must, before withdrawing from the cruse, 
give the patient sufficient notice so the patient ca1~ 
procure other medical attent~on if he· desires. ( Ci-
tations.) 
• • • • 
"In Mucci v. Houghton, 89 Iowa 608, 57 N.W. 
305, 306, the court announces the law as foilows: 
'If a physician or surgeon be sent for to attend a 
patient, the ·effect of his responding to the call, 
in the absence of a special agreement, will be an 
engagement to attend th·e case as long as it needs 
attention, 'IJIYile.ss he gives notice of hi;s intention 
t.o discontinue his services~ or is dismissed by the 
pa.tient; and he is bound to exercig;e reasonable 
and ordinary care and skill in determining when 
he should discontinu-e his treatment and serv-
ices.'" 
The Court, at page 212, quoted with approval from 
the Maine case of Barbour v. Martiln: 
"'A physician who leaves a patient, at a criti-
cal stag-e of the dkease, without reason, or suffi-
ciewt notice to e.nable the party to p:rocure ano.fher 
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1nedica.Z attendant, is guilty of a culpable derelic-
tion of duty.'" 
It will be noted, although again the language is not 
applicable to the illness of a physician, that the law recog-
nizes the ability of the physician to withdraw from a case, 
providing "he gives the patient sufficient notice so the 
patient can procure other medical attention if he desires." 
It is likewise apparent from the language quoted and ap-
proved by this eourt, and the emphasis the opinion places 
on the fact, that abandonment must oecur at a relatively 
"critical stage of the d~sease." It is obvious that the in~ 
herent theory of abandonment is that it occurs suddenly 
and unexpectedly at a time when medical attention is 
urgently required and in such a way that the patient is 
unable to secure other assistance which is then urgently 
needed. 
The case of Stahlman v. Davis, 220 N.W. 247, 60 
A.L.R. 658 (Neb. 1928) is closer factually to the instant 
case, although with ~a major point of distinction. There 
the plaintiff, age 18, had osteomyelitis in the femur above 
the knee. On N·ovember 12, 1923, defendant, Dr. B. B. 
Davi·s, perfonned the initial operation, and later on 
February 4, 1924, a second operation during which a 
piece of the femur was removed. No cast or splint was, 
placed on the leg until ~£arch 8, 1924. However, on F'eb-
ruary 20, 1924, Dr. B. B. Davis became iii and went to the 
Mayo CTinic for consultation, returning to Omaha Febru-
ary 26, 1924, whe-re he remained but a few hours. continu-
Ing on to Arizona where he thereafter remaine1d for a 
month. While in Omaha for those few hours on F'ebru-
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ary 26, 1924, he caHed on his patient at the hospital, ex-
amined x-rays, and consulted a Dr. Herbert Davis in 
whose charge he had placed the patient. At th~e t'ime he 
left for the Mayo Clinic as well as for Arizona he wholly 
failed to notify either the patient or the patient's father 
of his intended absence, and the patient was taken over 
wholly without h'is consent, or the consent of his father, 
by Dr. Herbert Davis. In fact the patient and his father 
were not advised of the absence of Dr. B. B. Davis until 
March 7, 1924, when a Dr. Lord took over the case. 
The court defined the duty of the doctor under such 
circumstances ·as follows, A.L.R. page 662: 
"When a surgeon performs an operation, not 
only must he use reasonable care and skill in its 
p·erformance, but also, in subsequent tre·atment of 
the case, it 'is hi's duty to giv·e the patient such 
attention after opeTation as the necessities of the 
case dem·and, in the absence of any special agree-
ment limiting the service or reasonable notice to 
the patient. 
* • • * 
"We do not overlook the fact that the doctor 
was ill; that his physical condition prevented the 
rendition of further services. But his physical 
condition did not interfere with or prohibit the 
giving of due and ample notice of his diS'ability to 
his patient or to his patient's father. Th·e clear 
duty, under the circumstances, was imposed upon 
him either to secure the patient's acceptance of 
the substitution of his son, Doctor Herbert Davis, 
or to give him notice so as to secure another physi-
cian or surgeon of his own choice." 
Again the court emphasizes the necessity of a critical 
condition in the patient, page 663 : 
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"The record contains ample evidence wllich, if 
believed, sustains the conclusion that, at the time 
the defendant herein left Nebraska for Arizona, 
the plain,tiff was in critical condit~on. 
"The undoubted rule applicable to the situa-
tion is that a 'physician who leaves a patient in a 
critical stage of the disease, without reason or 
suffieient notice to enable the party to procure 
another medical attendant, is guilty of a culpable 
dereliction of duty and is liable therefore'. (Cita-
tion)." 
It is apparent that appellant gave· notice to the 
parents of respondent of his condition so that they could 
secure another physician if desired, which is precisely 
the action indicated by the Stahlman and Budge case~s, 
supra. It is also apparent fron1 the record herein that 
respondent 'vas in reality not in any critical condition 
at the time 'Of notificat1ion of the doctor's illness. In this 
regard the evidence is clear that from the middle of June 
until the early part of October the only purpose of the 
visits to the doctor's office by respondent was to secure 
a change of the dressing on the incision are~a, and during 
this period also respondent was wearing a scultetus at 
the prescription of the doctor, which was nothing more 
than a cloth corset to assist in holding the stomach 
muscles in proper place. About the middle of September 
appellant gave 1\frs. Spendlove an antiseptic prepar'ation 
to dust on the incision area and had Mrs. Spendlove 
change the dressing at her home, visiting the doctor only 
once a week. During this period there was an exterior 
infection at the incision site and some small bean like 
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bumps indicative of a hernia. By the middle of Septenl-
ber, or perhaps a little earlier, it had become apparent 
that a third operation for correetive repair surgery was 
required. In this connection, however, the testimony of 
Dr~ George Miller who was calle·d by respondent, ap-
pellant, Dr. Clair Judd (and there was no testilnony 
whatsoever to the contrary) all indicated that so long 
as infection remained at the site of the operation it was 
not sound p·ractice to attempt a corr-ective opera.ti.on be-
oause of the danger of spreading the infection,. Also both 
Dr. Miller and appellant testified that frequently such 
corrective surgery is delayed for a period of six to twelve 
months to permit the muscles of the stomach around the 
incision to develop· and restore their tone and to avoid 
dealing with what was described as friable tissue. It 
is perfectly obvious from this record that during all this 
period the purpose of treatment was simply to assist in 
changing the dressings to the end that the body itself 
vvould cure the infection and permit the third op·eration. 
In fact from November 7, 1952 until the third operation 
of F·ebruary 28, 1953, this is. essentially all that was done 
at the L.D.S. Hospital, about whose care no complaint is 
being made, except that the visits there· were from ten 
days to two weeks apart and less frequent than they had 
been to appellant's office. In short, and as appellant 
advised Mrs. Spendlove and testified, there was no ur-
gency in any illness that respondent had at the time of 
or more accurately during the period within which re-
spondent ·claims abandonment occurred. The additional 
element, and underlying premise in abandonment cases of 
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critical or serious iHness at the time of the active aban-
donment is in no sense present in this case. 
The Stahlman case, supra, points out that under the 
circumstances of illnes·s a doctor does not have the ability 
to substitute another physician for himself. Thus at page 
662: 
"It is also to be remembered in this connection 
that the facts in the record disclose that the de-
fendant, by his excellent preparation and for 
thirty odd years of successful practice, had ac-
quired peculiar qualifications and special know-
ledge on the subject of surgery. In short, his 
employment by the plaintiff was, in fact, if not in 
name, the employment of a specialist or an expert 
in surgery. It would seem, in view of the nature 
of his employment and the circumstances and 
conditions of hi~s patient, as shown by the record 
'in this case, that to substitute for himself another 
physician of but three or four years' experience in 
the practice, without any notice to, or agreement 
with, the pati~ent involved or those representing 
him would be not only a clear violation of duty 
but, in effect, to utterly abandon the case." 
This statement above from the Stahlman case as to 
medical custom is confirmed without contradiction in the 
testimony of appellant and of Dr. Clair J'udd, both of 
whom stated that having notifi~ed the patient of the illness 
and the inability of the physician to attend any further, 
the patient, or the individual in whose custody the patient 
is at that time, alone can select another doctor for further 
treatment, if in fact the selection is required because of 
the illness of the patient. This would almost seem obvious 
in any professional relationship, but appellant did nort 
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stop with notification, he 'vent further in an additional 
step not technically required at all, when he asked Mrs. 
Sp:endlove whethe-r or not she desired him to get her 
another doctor. When she replied "No" and hung up the 
telephone, there was nothing he could do. As a practical 
matter and as will be more fully pdinted out hereinafter, 
we believe it immaterial in one sense whether the patient 
actually saw another doctor or not, because t.here i.s not 
one scintilla of evidence to indicate the necessity of arnJ-
thilng further than dressing changes which Mrs. Sp·end-
love, under instructions given her by the app·ellant, did 
every single d.ay of the period, accordin.g to her own 
testimowy. 
Moreover, it is clear from the authorities that the 
purpose of the notice is simply to advise the patient of 
the inability to attend so that the p·atient has an oppor-
tunity to secure other medical ass1istance. Appellant was 
seeing respondent only once per week during the month 
of Septembe·r, 1952, and the L.D.S. Hospital outpatient 
clinic saw him only about once each two weeks when 
he was taken to them in November through F'ebruary 
1953. It is utterly without reason to contend that 
respondent, or his parents who were responsible for his 
care, did not have amply opportunity to secure: any medi-
cal assistance required. Yet respondent ntust show this 
by a prep·onderance of evidence to establish one of t.he 
essential elements of the ab-andonment. 
Causal relationship· 
Whether or not the act of abandonment occurred in 
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this case is in one ·sense immaterial, since there is no 
evidence whatsoever to establish any causal relation 
between the fact that for a period of approximately 4 
to 5 weeks the respondent did not receive any active 
supervision by a doctor, and any resulting or adverse 
effect on hi's physical condition, or that such lack of 
attention in anyway added to or pro-longed any pain or 
suffering. 
The decisions on this subject clearly esta'blish the 
rule that such relation must be. shown by competent 
evidence, a burden of the plaintiff, and that it may not be 
left to conjecture or surmise on the part of the jury. 
Where, as here, the problem centers on the ne·cessity of 
considering physiological characteristics of the. human 
body \vhich are in the province of experts, the problem 
is not one 'vhich is perfectly obvious to a layman, and 
expert medical testimony is require·d to establish causa-
tion. 
In Rodgers v. Lawson, 170 F. (2d) 157 (C.A.D;C., 
1948), an action for malpractice was brought against the 
doctors for failure to use proper care in treating the 
breasts of plaintiff following the birth of her child, 
including a1nong other things an alleged abandonment 
of the c~se. Defendant Lawson delivered plaintiffs baby 
and undertook prenatal care, during which later period 
she had a soreness of her breasts and othe·r difficulties 
\vhich the doctor seerned to have indicated to her were 
not unusual and to be expected. By five weeks after the 
baby 'vas born, the breast pains had increased to an ex-
treme intensity. Dr. Lawson refused to call at the horne 
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and the husband of plaintiff thereafter retained another 
doctor. This doctor imn1ediately examin·ed her breast 
and operated on the srune the san1e evening inserting 
tubes for drainage. The court of appeal's upheld the 
lower court's directed verdict and stated on causation at 
page 162: 
"It is true that the evidence sho\VS that Mrs. 
Rodgers suffered severe pain for an extended 
p;eriod. But tHis, without more, does not evidence 
neglect by the defendant. The pain wa:s obviously 
the result of the pooling and pressure of t11e rnilk. 
This ·common postnatal condition_ was, so far as the 
evidence shows, brought about by nature, not by 
the defendant. There is no evidence tha:t due pro-
fessional care required the admini~stration of seda-
tives. It appears from Dr. Bailey's testi1nony that 
the·pirofession recognizes both incision and drain-
age on the one hand, and the more conservative 
treatment of symptoms on the other, as proper 
measures. Early incision and drainage would 
ap·p·arently, in view of the relief after Dr. Bailey's 
incision, have lessened the p:ain. But it is not 
shown that it was a departure fro1n prop~er pro-
fessional judgment for Dr. Lawson to choose 
to postpone in-cision until infection appeared and 
failed to respond to the treatment with hot Epsom 
salts and p·enicillin. It is common knowledge that 
even 'minor' surgery is fraught with danger and 
that good professional judgment at times requires 
expo1sure to pain rather than to the knife, that is 
to say, leaving t·he p·atient to the restorative pr.o-
cess of nature, aided n1edicinally rather than by 
surgery." 
In Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P. (2d) 1021 
(1938) it was claimed that defendant physician ha~ 
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negligently treated or failed to treat one Vida Edwards, 
1nother of plaintiffs, during a period following the birth 
of a child. She had encountered considerable difficulty 
in thi's birth and ultimately died from septic toxemia. 
The gist of complaint was that the doctor failed to pro-
perly diagnose her condition, and although he did see her 
periodically during this period of illness did not see her 
frequently enough nor make adequate examination to 
determine the existance. of the blood poison. There is 
an element, though in a different sense than in the instant 
case, of abandonment in the claimed negligence. The 
Court at page 1029 describes the type and quantum of 
evidence required to establish a causal relation between 
alleged negligence and resulting injury in a malpractice 
caS'e: 
"In the instant case it is difficult to find any-
thing the attending physicians. did that the evi-
dence shows they should not have done, or failed 
to do what 'the evidence shows they should have 
done. 
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not 
apply. In this both parties concur. There is no-
thing arising out of the case that 'shows anyt'hing 
the defendants could or should have done that 
would or could have changed the unfortunate 
result. The testimony of the father, mother, and 
husband of the deceased might give· rise to an 
inference that all was no:t done that they had in 
their minds afterwards might or should have been 
done. N othi;ng is indicated even in their testimowy 
as to what that w·as. To have submitted the cause 
of the jury would have set the jury to conjectur-
ing, surmising or guessing at the possibilities as 
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to what should or shouJd not have been do11,e . .i\ 
verdict of a jury may not be based on such con-
jectures.. (Citations). 
"In order to recover in such case the plain tiff 
mus't show that in treatment of the patient the 
·defendant physician did not exercise such care 
and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by sk'illed 
physicians, doing the s.ame type. of work in the 
vicinity, ·and that. the· want or failure of the· re-
quired skill and care- wa:s the cause of the injury 
complained of. That there might have been n,eglect 
or lack of skill is n.ot enough. To pernti.t a cause 
to go to the jury on testimony show,ing only pos-
s~bility, or what might or could have happ~ened, 
is t:o p:erm.it a jury to base a v.er'd'ict upon. con-
jecture, speculation or suspicion." 
In Anderson v. N·ixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P. (2d) 216 
(1943), plaintiff sought to recover judgment against de-
fendant doctor for alleged negligent treatment which re-
sulted in 'the loss of plaintiff's left leg. On N ovemher 30, 
1937, plaintiff had received a puncture wound on his hand 
from a coyote bite and a few days thereafter consulted 
the doctor, during which time his arm and hand became 
progres-sively wors~e. By December 10, his left leg 'began 
to ache and the. doctor thereafter called on him at his 
home diagnosing leg trouble as rheumatism. The condi-
tion of the leg became increasingly worse until on Decem-
ber 19, 1937, some neighbors took plaintiff to another 
doctor who operated after discovering osteomyelitis of 
the left tibia. About a year later, and in vi~ew of the. con-
tinued existence of the disease, the leg was amputated. 
There was no expert testimony introduced showing that 
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a physician in the exercise of ordinary care woUld have 
known fro1n symptom·s that this plaintiff was suffering 
from a blood infection and that osteomylitis. should have 
been expected. The prov-er treatment would have been 
bed-rest, good die't and to make patient as comfortable as 
possible and defendant did not so instruct or direct the 
plaintiff. vVhile the court held there was sufficient evi-
dence of negligence to submit the case to the jury, it is 
also held that under the circu1nstances the evidence did 
not drsclose a causal relation with any dam-age or injury. 
The Court stated a:t Page 220: 
Plaintiff, however, based his case on the 
failure of Dr. Nixon to recognize that ostemyeli-
tis had set in by Decernber 10, 1937, and to treat 
him for it properly by administering blood trans-
fusions and operating in time. There was no 
expert evidence in this case that if defendant had 
done these things at that tin1e the condition which 
caused the eventual amputation of plaintiff's leg 
could have been avoided. No expert testified that 
had DT. Nixon recognized the symptoms of oste-
ornyeli tis he could have alleviated or cured it by 
using the ordinary skill, care, and knowledge of 
a physician practicing in that vicinity. As to blood 
transfusions, one expert did testify that it was 
beneficial in blood stream infections, but did not 
testify that had there been transfusions the end 
result 1night have been avoided. Osteomyelitis 
being a disease the cause and cure of which is 
peculiarly within the knowledge of medical m·en 
and not a matter of common knowledge, it is 
necessary to have expert testimony on the· effect 
of the negligence of a doctor on the end result. 
In this case there was no evidence that anything 
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Dr. Nixon did or failed to do after oHteonryelitis 
developed caused the end result. In th·e absence 
of such expert testiinony there is nothing upon 
which a jury can base its finding on the proxi1nate 
cause of the injury. A jury may no:t conjecture or 
speculate, but n1ust have substantial evidence upon 
which to ba.se a verdict. (Citation)" 
Again in Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. 
(2d) 566 (1949), this court stated at page 568: 
"It is fundan1ental that the burden rests upon 
the plaintiff to establish the caus-al connection 
between the injury and the alleged negligence of 
the defendant; (Citations); that the court rnay not 
permit the jury to speculate concerning defen-
dants' liability; (Citation) ; and that the court is 
required to direct a verdict u,nless there is e1.Yi-
denc.e from w·hic1h the jury could reasonably find 
in favor of the plaintiff. * * * 
"Analyzing the testimony to determine 
whether or not plaintiff has sustained a burden of 
proving a causal connection between the alleged 
negligent acts of the defendant and the injury 
to the plaintiff, we find that under the pres·ent 
record the jury would be required to speculate 
·and guess on too 1nany elements in the chain of 
causation." 
See also Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. (2d) 257 
(1931); Sm.ith v. Bea.rd, 110 P. (2d) 260 (Wyo. 1941); 
Gray v. Davidson, 130 P. (2d) 341 (Wash. 1941). 
U·pon the evidence before the court there is no basis 
establishing any cauRal relation between the failure of 
ap·p·ellant to attend the respondent and any pain or injury 
of any Kind. 
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After respondent was discharged from the Utah 
Valley Hospital about June 10, 1952, he was taken to 
appellant's office approximately once a week until some-
time in late July or August. During the early part of 
this period the doctor had recommended the use of a 
scultetus binder for the ~bdomen (a cloth corset) and 
was changing the dressin.g over the incision a.s might 
be expected. Toward July or August it began to appear 
tha:t the incision might again start giving way and there 
began to appear a small drainage from an infection near 
the 'incision. About this time, according to Mrs. Spend-
love, a small abscess was lanced and thereafter the patient 
visited the doctor about twice a week. Mrs. Spendlove 
testified that about the middle of September the appellant 
instructed her to change the dressing on the incision 
daily, and to bring the patient in once a we:ek. He also 
gave her a therapeutic prescription to dust on the in-
cision. Mrs. Spendlove changed dressing ·every day there-
after until the respondent was ultimately taken to the 
Out-Patient Clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital on November 
7, 1952, which was after the Spendloves themselve-s had 
secured the release of appellant from the case. The 
testimony likewise indicates that at one tim·e in August 
the doctor had removed a small piece of cotton suture 
which had worked itself to the surface at the small in-
fection sinus. During the month of September the doctor 
would probe for sutures, clean the wound, put an an-
tiseptic powder on it, and change the dress'ing, replacing 
the binder. In essence he was only doing that which 
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nfrs. Spendlove testified she herself had done. The evi-
dence fails to disclose even any suggestion that anythling 
else could be done, and affirmatively indicates that in 
fact the only thing which could he accomplished wa.s to 
keep prop·er dressings on the incision area to the end 
that the body itself would cure this infection, which 
would permit the corrective operation. 
The infection is a n1atter of vital in1portance, as all 
the doctors testified in detail as to the fact that so long 
a;s the drainage confinued at the post-operative sit~e there 
slrould be no further operation because of the danger 
that additional cutting of the abdomen at this point 
would tend to spread the infection, and possibly permit 
it to p~enetrate to the /interior of the stomach. The in-
fection had to be cleared up. The doctnrs also testified 
that the corrective operation would not be p·erformed 
ordinarily for a period of six to twelve months to give 
the muscles of the abdoinen an opportunity to heal, 
strengthen and solidify. In other words, whether there 
had hee~n infection or not, the operation in all probability 
would not have occurred until the time when it was act-
ually performed in February of 1953. So far a.s the prob-
ing for cotton suture which rem-ained from the previous 
operation was concerned, it will he noted that when 
respondent on November 7, 1952 was taken to the L.D.S. 
Hospital, and placed under the care of Dr. George Miller, 
a cotton suture was removed, yet Dr. Miller continued 
dressing changes which is ·all that had ·been occurring 
during all of this p·eriod, and continued to probe ·at e'ach 
of the examinations which were about two weeks apart. 
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1\loreove.r, he testifie~d that a suture tends to work out 
of the wounds. It seems obvious. that a suture remorved 
as late as Decen1ber would not have worked up from the 
'vound until this date as there were almost two months of 
medical care of Dr. Miller before it did so, a fact which 
he describes as. a probability. There is not one scintilla 
of evidence in this record to the contrary. 
The medical testimony, therefore, in detail and logic 
affirmatively indicates that the fact tha:t the patient was 
not seen by appellant during the period did not retard the 
tin1e of operation, and in fact under the circumstan~es 
had no rela.ti1on to the. rapidity or the extent of cure 
because the point was simply to permit the body to cure 
the infection which existed. It is therefore obviously 
i1nmaterial whether the doctor attended the patient dur-
ing this n1onth or not, and particularly in view of the 
fact that Mrs. S-pendlo:ve herself was doing essentially 
all that a doctor would have done which was to change 
the dressings. It is utterly preposterous. to assert that 
the fact that the doctor did not see the patient for ap-
proxirnately four or five times during the m·onth adde~d to 
any pain or suffering, rnental or otherwise, 'Of respondent. 
This very obviously is a matter deating with the 
relation of infection to operative procedures, and treat-
rnent of infection to cure the same. While it is not a 
complicate·d subject, it is one which is not within the 
purview of the average layman, and in fact must neces-
sarily be controlled by expert testimony. It ~is highly 
significant that the respondent made no attempt what-
soever t.o pToduce a single 1nedical U)'ifness to testify on 
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this subject, nor any testiutony of any kind to indicate 
anything which eould or should have been done, and 
whidh would in anyway have affected the healing of in-
fection. 
What respondent did atternpt to do was to utilize 
evidence of laymen which in and of itS'elf proved nothing, 
and there is in fact no causal evidence from this source 
in the record. Mrs. Spendlove testified that during the 
approximate four or five w·eek period of ahandonn1ent 
respondent 'had pain in his abdo1nen, was p·ale, did not 
feel well and lost we1ight. Mrs. Breinholt, sister of re-
spondent who visited the Sp·endlove·s' home frequently 
during all of the period of illness, attempted to testify to 
the same thing. Yet on cross-exa1nination both witnesses 
freely admitted that each of these claimed sympltonTs of 
illness had existed long prior. to such period of claimed 
abandonment. This patient had lost weight beginning 
with the time of the first op·eration and his critical ill-
ness at that point. He h·ad during all of such period had 
pain for, as app·ellant explained, the ulcer itself on the 
interior of the stomach would not have healed and would 
cause p·ain. The same thing is true of the other symptoms 
of p:aleness, and a tire.d feeling which would obviously 
exist from the two p·revious critical illnesses of respond-
ent. 
It is a n1at1ter of regret that the respondent himself 
could not have told the jury what pains and suffering he 
was incurring during the entire period of illness and par-
ticularly the four or five week period of claimed abandon-
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January and February when he was unde·r treatment at 
the L.D.S.. Hospital. If ever a jury was left to utter 
speculation and conjecture, this jury was when the court 
submitted this case to them. In fact, the evidence so 
strongly indicates a continued course of illness which 
was unaffected by the failure of respondent to visit the 
doctor's offices for four or five visits and which arose 
out of a period of illness as to which there is no claim 
of negligence, that the consideration of the jury on 
causation can scarcely be said to have arisen to the level 
of conjecture. 
It should likewise he noted that the doctor told ~frs. 
Spendlove in the conversation of October 10 that there 
was no urgency as to the condition of respondent; that he 
affirmatively testified as to the lack of any emergency; 
and that in fact when Dr. Miller first saw the patient on 
November 7, 1952 he described him as being in good phy-
sical condition except for the distention of the stomach 
and the drainage at the incision area. As to the disten-
tion, the mechanics of that were explained by the doctor, 
the fact that it was not painful, and that it was easily 
controlled by a scultetus binder or a corset of any kind 
which he had instructed 1\Irs. Spendlove to use and which 
she apparently did use. 
All of the foregoing is fortified by the treatment 
rendered to patient at L.D.S. Hospital. Appellant was 
seeing him prior to his illness once a we~k, yet the 
L.D.S. Hospital staff saw 'him less frequently, which 
would se~em an affirmative indication that either they 
were not as diligent as appellant, or tha.t lin fact the pa-
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tient had 'sustained some recovery during the four or five 
week period. 
It is, theT·efore, submitted that there is a complete 
and total lack of evidence to establish causation and that 
in fact the evidence affirmatively indicates the non-
existence of the same. 
Negligence of Spendloves 
Among the defenses interposed to this action was 
that of the negligence of the parents. Dr. Clair Judd of 
Sp~ringville, Utah was thoroughly cognizant with the 
medical :history of the respondent. H·e had assisted in 
both opera.tio:ns and 'had actively supervis·ed the patient 
for a period of one week whil·e he was hospitalized follow-
ing the S'econd operation. The parents denied knowledge 
of his p·a!rticipation in the operation, but they knew that 
he was familiar with the case since during the week's 
absence Mrs. SpendloiVe talked to him daily a;bout the 
patient. On ·October 10, 1g.52, they knew that Dr. Georges 
was seriously ill with pneumonia. There is no reason 
nor excuse for the failure of the Spendlove family to 
call Dr. Clair Judd, if in fact any medical attention 'vas 
required, although for reasons indicated above, we doubt 
this. They did not do so, although appellant in discussing 
his patients With Dr. JUdd had in effect brought him to 
date on the Sp·endlove case and requested him to take 
care of the patient ~~ anything developed and if he was 
called by the Spendloves. There is nothing to show any-
thing did develop·, but the Sp·endloves did not choose 
to call a doctor. Of course, the·y had no obligation \vhat-
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s·oever to call Dr. Judd, and for all appellant is advised 
they may not have cared to do so. This would make no 
difference, because the testimony affirmatively shorws 
that the're were numeTous other practicing physicians 
and surgeons in Provo during all of the time. In other 
words, if in :fact respondent required any medical atten-
tion from a doctor it was as simple as p'icking up the 
phone and calling either Dr. Judd or some other doctor 
a:s selected. This then, assuming attention was required, 
'vas inexcusable negligenc·e by any standard whi'ch might 
be implied, and served to deprive this respondent of the 
very thing which they complain he did not receive. It is 
as a matter of law negligence which caused any injury or 
suffering which respondent might have sustained. 
The effect of the negligence of the parents, in whose 
custody a minor has been placed, is indicated in Brown 
v~ Dark, 119 S.\V. (2d) 529 (Ark. 1938). There in an ac-
tion by the father for himself and a:s next fr'iend of his 
rninor son, age 6, the boy had suffered a green stick fraC-
ture of the left arm. Shortly thereafter the father took 
the boy to Dr. Brown's office who felt the arm should be 
x-rayed. They then went to a neighboring town where 
a Dr. 1fcAdams performed an x-ray and together with 
Dr. Brown placed a splint on the boy's arm. At the thne 
that the boy was in Dr. ~lcAdams' office the doctor let the 
father take the boy home on the promise to return him 
to the office in case of any swelling. The father did take 
the boy to the home but did not later return him to the 
doctor's offiee for consultation. The father did, however, 
consult thereafter with Dr. Brown the. initial physician. 
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Swelling developed under the cast and ultin1a.tely a.n op-
eration waE ~erformed by a third doctor when osteomy-
letis of the bone· develop-ed producing a Voikmann's par-
alysis. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed and the 
cause dismissed by the court, which viewed the ne.gligence 
of the fathe·r as the source of injury. · The court stated, 
p~age 5·34: 
"Our conclusion is that appellee has failed to 
·support his allegations with substantial evidenee. 
This is a case where a layman took chances and 
experienced misfortune of a tragic nature. If the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, the judg-
ments might be sustained. But it does not. Medi-
cine and surge.ry are inexact sciences, and phy-
sicians are not guarantors of results. Our vie'v 
is that permanent injuries to appellee's son were 
occasioned by app·ellee's own negligence or error 
of judgment in not leaving the patient with Dr. 
McAdams when it became ap·parent infection had 
developed. 
"The judgments are reversed and the causes 
dismissed." 
This case. is somewhat similar to the instant case 
in that the p·arents of the boy who w·as unable to care for 
himself them·selves failed to take any necessary steps 
Which might have bee-n required, and did not return the 
boy to the doctor for fu~rther examination. In the instant 
case .the parents did not call or attempt in any w·ay. to 
reach another doctor to attend respondent. It is. sub-
mitted that the negligence of th·ese p·arents is obvious, 
although ·appellant must necessarily concede that the 
same problem of causal evidence is present since the 
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record simply does not seem to indicate in any way the ef-
fect upon respondent of the fact that a doctor did not ex-
amine him during the four o1r five we·ek period. 
The foregoing is equally applicable to the status of 
the ·evidence at the conclusion of the respondent's case as 
it is to the conclusion of all evidence. The additional 
testimony introduced in behalf of appellant does, how-
ever, amplify considerably the details, nature and extent 
of the appell·ant's illness, and of the two operations which 
were performed in April and May long prior to the period 
as to which complaint is. norw made. There is additional 
testilnony with reference to the conversation wherein 
appellant notified Mrs. Spendlove of his illness in fuat 
he not only offered to get another doctor but asked if 
Mrs. Spendlov€ wanted to call Dr. Clair Judd. The 
notice specifying the illness and the offer to secure me-di-
cal assistance were detailed by Mrs. Spendlove in her 
versi'On of this conversation. There was additional testi-
rnony likewise introduced by appellant with reference 
to the desirability and necessity of permitting an infec-
tion near the incision site to heal before further 'OpeT~a­
tion could be performed, and ·also as to the necessity of a 
wait to permit the muscle tone to re'Store. However, this 
expert medical opinion had heen testified to by Dr. Miller 
who wa.s cal'led by the respondent and whose testimony 
was illtroduced as a part of the respondent's case. 
In conclusion, therefore, it is earnestly submitted 
that both of the motions should have been grante~d by the 
lower court, based upon the uncontradicted testimony 
which completely negatives any poss:ibility that an effec-
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tive ·abandonment could have occurred. 
Point No.3 
This error is directed to the failure of the court to 
give app·ellant's requested ins~tructiun No. 5 (R. 38), 
wllich reads as follorws : 
"In determining whether or not the defendant 
properly discharged his responsibilities as a phy-
sician and surgeon in this case, you should judge 
the defendant by comp~a.rison of his conduct with 
the standard of conduct on the part of the ordinar-
ily and reasonwbly careful physician and surgeon 
practicing in Provo, Utah in the year 1952. The 
fact that the defendant may have conducted him-
self in a manner different from the way docto(fs 
ordinarily perform their services in other coin-
munities, if such be the fact, is immaterial be-
cause the defendant was required only to exercise 
such reasonable care, diligence and consideration 
f'Or his patient as was ordin·arily exercised by the 
ordinarily skillful physician and surgeon practiC-
ing in Provo, Utah, in the year 1952. 
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in 
this case that the defendant exercise·d the ordinary 
and re1asonable ca.re, diligence and consideration 
of his patients as was exercised by the ordinarily 
skillful physic'ian and surgeon in Provo, Utah in 
1952, you mu·st return a verdict in favor of the 
defendant and against the p1aintiff no cause of 
action." 
It would seem ·axiomatic in a malpractice cas·e that 
the actions of a ·doctor be- me!asured against the practice 
in his or or substantially similar communities. Thls fact 
is of particular importance in thlis case, since there was 
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expert 1nedical testirnony to the effect that in Provo, 
Utah, when a doctor becomes ill his obligation is no more 
than to notify the patient of such illness, and beyond that, 
he is prohibited by professional eth'ics from forcing an-
other doctor on the patient. In other words, the selection 
of the doetor is and remains with the patient or those in 
vvhose custody he has been placed. The court in Stahlman 
v. Davis, supra, seen1ed to have affirmatively accepted 
this professional standard without question and probably 
\vithout a0tual testimony in this regard, and 'in fact 'the 
Stohlman case founds liability of the doctor upon the 
very fact that he did attempt to imp10se another doctor 
of inexperience on the patient. This evidence, therefore, 
\Ve feel vvas particularly significant in this case. 
Notwithstanding this, and in the face of appellant's 
requested instruction No. 5, specifical'ly covering this 
point, the trial court refused to give any instruction what-
soever on the subj,ect. vVe are l~eft to utter conjecture 
as to what standard the jury may have applied in this 
regard, and the vice of the failure is that they may have 
considered this point against a background of knowl-
edge they possessed, baHed on experience in other areas 
or states which may be inconsistent with the testi1nony 
\Vhich had been introduced. Appellant was entitled to 
have the jury instructed on this subject, and th~e failure 
of the court to do so constituted reversible error. 
Poin.t No.4 
This error vvas directed to the fa:il ure of the court 
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"You are instructed that the sole is'Sue of 
negligence c}aim·ed by plaintiff in this ca;se is 
whether or not Dr. S. W. Georges abandoned the 
plalintiff in the fall of 1952, beginning on the date 
on which Mrs. Maude Spendlove, mother of plain-
tiff, talked to Dr. S. W. Georges at his hom·e and 
was to~d the Doctor was ill, and ending with the 
date on which Bishop Stone obtained the releas.e 
from Dr. Clair Judd rel-ative to placing plaintiff 
rmder care of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
"·There has been evidence introduced in this 
case relative to. the operations pHrrormed by the 
defendant on th·e plaintiff on Ap.ril 2·5, 1952 and 
May 5, 1952, and the care rendered by him in con-
necii!on there·with. 'Such evidence is not to be 
considered by you as any indication that plaintiff 
claims damage or injury resulting from either of 
the t\vo operations or from the treatment af-
forded to the plaintiff by defendant with respect 
to said operations. Plaintiff does n'ot make such 
claim." 
Appellant's requested instruction No. 9 set forth 
ruhove was intended to eonfine the attention of the~ jury 
on the issue of negligence to a spe~ific period, and to ad-
vise them that there was no claim of any improper m·edi-
cal diagnosis, p·erform'ance of the op:erations or post-
op·er:ative treatment outside orf such period. Appellant 
believes this to be of the utmost importance in this par-
ticular case, because of the fact that there was evidence 
of herni·rution 'Of ·an incision. Be~cause the issue was con-
fine~d to abandonment in a particular period, ap·pellant 
did not attempt to introduce expert medical testimony 
as to why the herniation occurred or whether in faGt there 
62 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,,·as anything unusual, or to negative the possible thought 
that this represented the result of any dereliction of duty 
of the appellant. The importance of this type of instruc-
tion 'vas that an incision had in fact he-rniated, which 
to the uneducated lay1nan might in and of itself indi'Cate 
negligence, a pot en tia.l to be avoided because a jury might 
in its ·own Inind decide that 'vhile there was no abandon-
Inent son1ething was wrong with the opera:tional pro-
cedure. Appellant "\Vas entitled to such an instruction, yet 
the court itself does not in any "\vay deal with the specific 
problem and the only reference to the period is found in 
its Instruction No.1 (R. 47) which is simply the opening 
summary of the claims of each of the parties. There is 
not the slightest admonition to the jury relative to the 
prior period of treatment and particularly the manner 
of pe·rfor1na.nce of the two prior operations, and certainly 
appellant was entitled to have this period of abandonment 
clearly defined not only as establishing the beginning and 
end of the period but excluding other periods irrelevant 
under the issues. This failure constituted prejudicial 
and reversible error, particularly since the requested 
instruction tied directly to the theory upon which defense 
of the action was based. 
Poilnts Nos. 5 and 6 
'~rhese t\vo points will be considered together, since 
they are related. Point No. 5 refers to the failure of the 
court to give appellant's requested instruction No. 11 (R. 
44), and Point No. 6 to the error of the court in giving 
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its instruction No. 5 (R. 49). The reque'St and the in-
struction read as follow'S: 
Ap~pellant' s requested instruction No. 11 
"You are instructed that in this case the plain-
tiff Gene 'Spendlove was a mental incomp·etent and 
a ward of the American Fork Training School, 
a public institution for mentally deficient persons. 
During all times herein involved he was living 
with an·d under the· dire'ct sup·ervision of his par-
ents, Maude ~and John Spendlove. 
"You are therefore instructed that the de-
fendant, Dr. S. W. George'S, had a right to assu1ne 
thart the parents. of Gene Spendlove would take 
'Such action with reference to employment of doc-
tors ~and seek proper medical attention for Gene 
Sp·endlove as would be t~aken by any normal per-
son in the exercise of reasonable care in his own 
behalf under similar circumstanees." 
The court's instruction No.5 
"In this action the defendant as an affinna-
tive defen1se -claims thrat the parents of the plain-
tiff were n~egligent in the particul,ars se't forth in 
Instruction No. 1. If you find that the defendant 
was guilty of malpractice or negligence, then you 
should consider an·d determine whether the par-
ents of the plaintiff, or either of them, were al'So 
guilty of negligence, and furthHr, whether such 
negligence wa:s an efficient intervening cause 
whi!ch displace:d the conduCit of the defendant in 
proximately producing the plaintiff~s injury and 
damage. However, if the negligence of the parents 
wa'S only a concurring cause of the plain'tiff's in-
jury, then you should find against the defendant 
on this defense. 
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"The test by which you will determine this 
iS'sue i'S as follows: If the defendant foresaw, or 
by the exercise of ordinary care would ha~e fore-
seen, the probability of the conduct of the p·arents 
of the plaintiff, and the probability th!a.t the de-
fendant's conduct and that of the parents would 
result in injury to the plaintiff, then the conduct 
of both was the proximate cause of the injury. 
But, if the probable result could not have been 
foreseen and if the immediate cause of the injury 
was the conduet of the parents, then your verdict 
rnust be in favor of the defendant, no cause of 
action. The burden is on the defendant to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence· the above 
proposition.'' 
Appellant's requested instruction No. 11 set forth 
above, advises the jury that the appellant had a right to 
assume that the Spendloves would t~ake such action with 
reference to the en1ployment of other doctors as would 
he taken by any normal pe-rson in the exercise of reason-
able care in his own behalf, in similar circumstances. 
This is a logical request and an important facet of this 
case, because this was an assumption tha1t the doctor wa:s 
entitled to make, particularly in view of the mental in-
capacity of the respondent. It defines a part of the re-
la;tion between the Spendloves and their respondent son, 
and affirmatively tells the jury that the parents are not 
strangers to this case, but individual's who have a definite 
obligation relative to 'the matter of securing and a.rr'ang-
ing for medical assistance, if it is required. However the 
court, in a studious attempt to avoid reference to the ac-
tions of the parents, fails to ins·truct the jury in this re-
gard. ~foreover, it directly rel·ates to the appellant's 
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possible action·s in view of the medieal testimony stating 
that in Provo, U'tah, professional ethics p~revented a 
physic~an from forcing a patient to accept another physi-
cian, and affirmatively showing that the most he can 
do ~s to advise either the patient or his custodian of an 
inrubilily to artJtend beeause of illness, pe~rhaps offer to 
secure other medical russistance, and to thereafter leave 
the matter to the patient or his parents. 
The instruction given by the court imposes a d~stinct­
ly different duty, however, and in effect des!troys the 
right of the physician to make such assumption and 
forces him into a guessing gam'e rus to what action the 
p~aren1ts Iillgh t take, . eve·n in the face of their positive 
knowledge of the physician's illness preventing him fron1 
attending :any p·atient or engaging in any way in his prac-
tice. Thi'S is so because the instruction states that if the 
ap·pellant foresaw, or should have foreseen, that the 
probability of the conduct of the p·arents of the respond-
ent would result rn injury to the patient, the:n that would 
unite with his actions a.nd both would be the prorimate 
cause. It then goes on to add that if the probable r~sult 
could not have been foreseen, and ·the :actions of the par-
ents were the immediate cause of injury, then the jury 
shall find for app·ellant. The physioian should be al-
lowed to assume that the p'arent1s will act as reasonable 
individuals in securing medical assis·tance, but the in-
struction in effect forces him to psychoanalyz-e the par-
ents to ·determine what these particular individuals might 
do under ·the circumstances. It would impose an un-:-
reasonwble and unwarranted burden so f.ar as the instant 
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case is concerned, particularly when it is e1st8.Jblishing a 
general obligation of the physician not to one case but 
to a tremendous number which may be pending in his 
practice at a time when he is stricken with illne1ss. The 
only logical ·and reasonable rule of law to be applied 
would permi·t the physician to assume that his P'atients 
will .a;ct as a re1aJsonable m'an would act under th·e cir-
cumstances, and not forcing him into a posrtion of trying 
to anticipate the actions they might take . 
.A!ppellant asserts that this di,stortion of the duty of 
the physician tovvard his patient is extremely prejudicial, 
contrary to the theory on which the defense was in part 
conducted, and since it n1ust have influenced the jury, 
prejudicial and reversible error. 
Point No. 7 
T·his point is directed to the Court's Instruction No. 
7 (R. 50), to which appellant excepted (T. 242, 243). The 
instruction attempted to define the act of abandonment, 
and reads as follows : 
"You are instructed that where a physician 
is employed to attend a patie·nt the relationship of 
physician and p·atient continues until ended by the 
consent of the p'arties, or revoked by the dismissal 
of the physici:an, or until his service1s are no longer 
needed. The physician is required to eX'ercise rea-
sona;ble and ordinary eare· and skill in determining 
when to diseont1nue his treatrnent, and where he 
fails to attend upon his pa:tient an1d t:ermin,ates 
hi1s employment without notice to his p1atient and 
without affording the latter an OiJ?'portun'ity 'to se-
cure other medieal attendance, he is liable for any 
damage caused thereby. 
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"In this cage if you find fro1n a preponder-
ance of the e·vidence that the defendant discontin. 
ued the care and treatmen~t of the p1lainfiff; that 
such care and tre:a.tn1ent was reasonably neces-
s·ary, and th•a:t th·e defendant failed to notify the 
p;laintiff or the plaintiff's parents th'aJt he 'vas 
d!i,scontinuing such care and treatment, or that he 
was un~abl·e to render further Hervice, then the 
defendant wa.s guilty of malpractice in abandon-
ing the pluintiff. And if you furthe-r find that the 
plaintiff suffered injury an·d damage as a proxi-
mate result of such eonduct on the p'art of the de-
fendant, then your verdict must be in favor of the 
plaintiff.'' 
·The one s:alient f1aet with reference to the. claimed 
abantlonment was the undisputed illnes's of the appellant 
during the period in which the abandonm·en't i'S claimed 
to have occurred. Yet the· instruction does not in any 
way mention such illness, but simply se't's forth an ab-
stract proposition of 11aw which s·eems to llave been taken 
from the ca:se of Ricks v. Budge, supra, and which is of 
limite·d assistance to the jury. 
The court undoubttedly h-ad difficulty in fr'aming this 
instruction because it is impos'Sible to do so upon facts 
as to wh!ich there is ·any dispute. In the second paragraph 
of the instruction ap·pears. the follo1wing: 
" ... that 'the defendant failed to notify the 
plain~tiff or the plain·tiff's p·arents that he was dis-
continuing such care and treatment, or that he was 
unablle to render further service, then the defend-
ant was guilty of malpractice- in abandoning the 
pl'Rin't!iff." 
Yet the testimony indicates without dispute that the 
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appellant notified Mrs. Spendlove of his serious illness, 
his inability to trea:t the patient, and even offered to get 
another doetor. The requirem'ents of the appellan~t's duty 
had 'apparently been fully sntisfied, yet it must have 
1nystified and confused the jury to find th~s instruction 
to be applied against the undisputed testimony, and ~n 
implication that the notice received by the parents was 
inadequate, and that something 'addi~tional or different 
\Vas required. If the 'COurt fel~t that something more was 
required, it 'Shoul1d have made that fa~ct clear to the jury 
and indicated just what might he involved in such /addi-
tional notice. In all events it should have tied the facts 
of this case to its definition of 'abandonment. Moreover, 
the instruction deal~s needlessly in unrelat·ed and abstract 
legalities. For example, in the first paragraph it states 
"r~ehe phys~ician is required to exercise reason-
able and ordinary care :and skill in determining 
\Vhen to discontinue his treatment ... " 
This 'vould s.ee1n to he an indication on the: part of 
tne court that there w'as somehow an issue on this before 
the jury, and that there was an element of volition on t.he 
part of the doctor in determining that his services were 
no longer require'd. Tt would he npplicable to a situation 
\vhere the physician si1nply ceases treatment although he 
is perfectly capable of continuing it if desired. That is 
distin~ctly contrary to the facts of this ease, where the 
physician was so ill he could not continue his pract'ice 
whether he wanted to or not. There is no issue before the 
jury on this stated rule of law and no reason why the 
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court shoul1d have given it since it could obviously cause a 
conjecture on their p1art whicl1 had no place in this cruse. 
Again, there is an illustration of the cour,t's approach to 
its instructions by the use o.f broad generalities of law, 
cor~ect in ·an academic sense, b11:t totally unre}ated 
to the ea:se. Unfortunately juries are not concerned with 
a legal education but in reaching a deersion on the facts 
of a case under the specific instructions of the court. 
Statements of l·aw unrelate1d to the facts can only le'ad 
to confusion, uncertainty, and error. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has wholly failed in his attempt to est31b-
lish the fact of abandonment, the bur,den of which he nee-
.ess~arily assumed. The undisputed evidence shows thrut 
when ~the app·ell'ant became so ill that he could no longer 
continue the p~ract!ce of medicine, the parents orf respond-
ent. were notified of this fact, and of an offer to secure 
other medic1al ·ass'istance if they desired, a choice neces-
sarily left to them. Ap,art from the f·act that the appel-
lant fulfille·d every requirement of the lruw o.f abandon-
ment 'SO far as notice was concerned, the evidence further 
failed to show the existence of an e1nergency or pressing 
need for medrcial service~s,. which is an additional elen1ent 
of abandonment. Moreover, there was not one scintilla 
of evidence to establish any causal relation between the 
·allege~d abandonment, even it if had been es taJblished, 
1and ·any pain or suffering of respondent, directly or in-
direetly. The jury could do nothing more than engage 
in the vaguest conjecture and surmis-e. 
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The instructions were essentially generalities of law 
which were not only of limited as~sistance ·to the jury, but 
tended to confuse ratheT than to establish a set of stand-
ards by which the evidence -could be adjudge·d by applic-
able legal princi})les. They consistently rejected the 
theory of the case which appellant was entl:tled to have 
submitted, if in fact there was any ba:sis upon which to 
submit the cause to the jury. 
Appelant submits that the trial court erred in the 
various rulings and acts set forth under the points herein 
presented and argued. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL J. GROTH and 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY 
&SNOW 
Attorneys for Appellan-t. 
Dated Septernber 8, 1954. 
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